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Abstract—Deep Neural Networks (DNN) have been widely
adopted in self-organizing networks (SON) for automating differ-
ent networking tasks. Recently, it has been shown that DNN lack
robustness against adversarial examples where an adversary can
fool the DNN model into incorrect classification by introducing a
small imperceptible perturbation to the original example. SON is
expected to use DNN for multiple fundamental cellular tasks and
many DNN-based solutions for performing SON tasks have been
proposed in the literature have not been tested against adversarial
examples. In this paper, we have tested and explained the
robustness of SON against adversarial example and investigated
the performance of an important SON use case in the face
of adversarial attacks. We have also generated explanations
of incorrect classifications by utilizing an explainable artificial
intelligence (AI) technique.
Index Terms—Adversarial machine learning, Self Organizing
Cellular Networks
I. INTRODUCTION
Driven by ambitious bandwidth and latency targets, and the
development of new domains such as IoT and connected vehi-
cles, 5G networks are becoming increasingly complex as they
incorporate disparate emerging trends such as network densi-
fication and co-existence with existing cellular technologies.
These networks also perform several challenging activities—
such as planning, dimensioning, deployment, testing, network
optimization, comprehensive performance monitoring, failure
detection, failure correction, and general maintenance—which
currently utilize large human resources in the loop. This
results in a network that is both costly–thus dissatisfying
for the cellular operator and error-prone–bringing customer
dissatisfaction and resulting in increased churn [1]).
In such scenarios, artificial intelligence (AI) driven self-
organized networks provides an attractive alternative by
providing the tools for performing automation with self-
organization and intelligence. The main objectives of the SON
are to build an intelligent network that can guarantee the net-
work resilience with reduced complexity, simplified network
management, and properly optimized network configurations
[2]. SON technology leverages advance in machine learning
(ML) and deep learning (DL) techniques to overcome the
multiple challenges of operating modern network through their
integral capability of handling and analyzing big data.
Even though ML and DL models can greatly outperform
traditional methods in obtaining excellent accuracy in benign
environments, it is also important to verify the robustness of
these models in adversarial settings, particularly since it has
been shown in recent work that adversarial examples can be
generated by malicious adversaries to fool the DL models very
easily by applying small perturbations to the original inputs
[3], [4]. More formally, an adversarial sample x∗ is created
by following the equation 1, where imperceptible perturbation
is denoted as δ; legitimate test example is denoted as x; the
deployed trained classifier is described by f(.); and t describes
the wrong class adversary wants to achieve.
x∗ = x+ argmin
ηx
{‖η‖ : f(x+ η) = t} (1)
Deep neural networks (DNN) work in a black box manner
and this lack of transparency can be a major drawback for
the security critical domains. Hence, explainable AI (XAI)
or black-box model interpretability plays an important part
in mitigating this threat of adversaries. Tomsett et al. [5]
proposed this phenomenon that XAI and adversarial machine
learning (AML) are conceptually linked, and insights into one
ot them can provide insights into the other. This is because
most vulnerable features after adversarial attacks, together
with the help of XAI and AML, can be identified and ulti-
mately any relevant defensive technique can be applied. This
interpretability becomes more important now because of the
recent adaptation of explainable AI at government levels like
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)1, which expresses
the importance of explanations of the logic involved when
automated decision making takes place [6].
The main contributions of our work are;
• Experimentally validated the impact of adversarial attacks
in the domain of SON.
• Demonstrated that the explainable AI and adversarial ML
are linked with each other and adversarial ML can be used
to describe feature representations of a DNN model.
• To the best of our knowledge, this study is first in the
domain of SON to test adversarial machine learning
(AML).
In the section II, we have provided a brief review of
the related research that focuses on SON, adversarial ML,
and explainable AI. Section III describes the methodology
1GDPR is an EU law regulation aiming at data protection and privacy for
all individual citizens of the European Union and the European Economic
Area.
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where we have discussed the assumed threat model, ML-
models used for a SON use case of detection of abnormal key
performance indicator (KPI), and dataset details used in this
experiment. Section IV provides the performance evaluation
of the adversarial attacks on the abnormal KPI detector before
and after the adversarial attack. Section IV provides the results
of adversarial training used as a defense against adversarial
attacks. Section V concludes the study and provides future
directions.
II. RELATED WORK
A. SON
To provide best cellular services to the end-users, efficient
network optimization is a continuous process of planning,
parametric configuration changes, operations and maintenance
with the help of large human interventions. Therefore, the
SON is introduced as an intelligent network that provides
scalability, agility, and stability to maintain the operators’ and
consumers’ desired objectives [7]. A fundamental property of
the SON is the ability to interact and learn from the networking
environment to adapt to the changing circumstances.
Three main functions of SON: self-configuration, self-
healing, and self-optimization perform these automatic tasks
[8]. Self-configuration manages tasks of automatic configura-
tion of cellular network nodes. The main use cases are plan-
ning and modifying the radio and transport parameters. Self-
optimization manages solutions that target cellular network
performance optimization based on the operator specifications.
The main use cases of this category are handover parameters
optimization, QoS-related parameters optimization, and load
balancing. Whereas self-healing manages tasks to automatic
detection and rectification of failures in network.
In the context of cellular systems, DNNs are applied in
all three categories of SON. Feng et al. [9] used DNN to
implement Cell Outage Detection. Daroczy et al. [10] used
ML to predict Radio Access Bearer (RAB) sessions drops well
before the end of the session. Other important work for SON
in cellular networks using DNN include resource optimization
[11], and mobility management [12]. Recently, Chen et al. [13]
combined adversarial training with variational autoencoders to
unsupervised learning the behavior of abnormal KPI on the
Internet.
An adversary can affect DNN models of SON through
internal and external attacks. In the case of internal attacks,
adversaries can corrupt training data and classifiers of DNN
models of SON directly. However, these internal attacks are
not easily possible due to the difficult task of adding adver-
sarial examples directly into the input of the DNN model.
Whereas, external attacks can utilize vulnerabilities of data
collection process of cellular networks. Base stations collect
measurement reports and pass it SON function that uses this
collected data to implement its different functionalities for
network optimization. Adversarial examples can be injected
into this data collection process with the help of a rogue
base station. Shaik et al [14] demonstrated the security vul-
nerabilities of SON-enabled LTE networks. They injected the
fake data into the SON ecosystem with the help of a rogue
base station. There work is mainly concerning DoS attacks on
cellular networks and user devices.
B. Adversarial Attacks on SONs and Cognitive Networks
Most of the current research of adversarial machine learning
is relevant to computer vision tasks, such as Szegedy et al. [3]
shows that deep neural network can change its prediction by
using non-random perturbation in its inputs. These changes are
imperceptible due to the extremely low probability of negative
adversaries in every test set. Goodfellow et al. [4] and Papernot
et al. [15] extended this initial study and proposed Fast
Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) and Jacobian-based Saliency
Map Attack (JSMA) respectively for generating adversarial
examples. FGSM is a technique for crafting an adversarial
example where one step gradient update is performed in the
direction of the sign associated with the gradient at each
feature in the test example. The FGSM perturbation (η) is
given as:
η = sign(∇xjθ(x, l)) (2)
Whereas JSMA is based on the concept of saliency maps.
This algorithm tries to find input dimensions or features that
are most vulnerable due to possible perturbations by creating
a saliency map and an iterated process to find misclassification
in the model.
J(x) =
∂f(x)
∂x
= [
∂f j(x)
∂(xi)
] (3)
Some recent studies of adversarial examples are performed
in the field of network intrusion detection systems (NIDS).
In these studies, significant degradation in accuracy is ob-
served for intrusion detection systems after exposing DNNs
to adversarial examples [16]. Whereas, Usama et al. [17]
investigated the vulnerability of Cognitive Self Organizing
Networks (CSON) utilizing ML/DL techniques against adver-
sarial attacks. In this study, we have performed FGSM and
JSMA attack on DNN-based abnormal KPI detector to show
that adversarial attacks can be fatal for this important use case
of SON.
C. Adversarial Defense Methods
Many methods have been proposed for making ML models
more robust and mitigating adversarial examples. Adversarial
Training [4] and Defensive Distillation [18] are two famous de-
fense techniques. We have implemented Adversarial Training
as a defensive technique for our experiments. The basic idea
of Adversarial Training is to train the model using adversarial
examples and assign the same labels of the original examples
to the adversarial examples.
D. Explainable AI
Current work of explainable AI or black-box model inter-
pretability lies within two categories: global and local inter-
pretability. Global interpretability describes the understanding
of the whole logic of a model and follows the entire reasoning
leading to all the different possible outcomes. Whereas local
interpretability is used to generate an individual explanation to
justify why the model made a specific decision for an instance
[19]. Some recent studies explored the link between XAI
and AML. Tomsett et al. [5] proposed this phenomenon that
XAI and adversarial machine learning (AML) are conceptually
linked, and insights in one can provide insights in the other
domain. Giurgiu et al. [20] used recurrent neural networks and
attention mechanism for explaining the failure predictions in
time series data. Marino et al. [21] proposed a methodology to
explain incorrect classifications made by Intrusion Detection
Systems (IDS) using the adversarial approach. In this paper,
we have used explainable AI to provide a deeper understanding
of the features involved in the adversarial ML attack on DNN-
based KPI detector.
III. METHODOLOGY
In this section, we will describe our procedure for perform-
ing two types of adversarial attacks on abnormal KPI detector
but before that, we will describe the threat model and the
dataset used in this experiment.
A. Threat Model
This subsection describes the major assumptions considered
for performing an adversarial attack on the use case of SON.
1) Adversary Knowledge: We have used two white-box
attack algorithms, which mean adversary has complete
knowledge about the model architecture, features, and
test data.
2) Adversarial Goals and Defense: Our goal in this ex-
periment is to check the vulnerabilities of SON against
adversarial examples. We have achieved this by measur-
ing accuracy before and after implementing attacks. We
have experimentally validated a defensive technique to
mitigate the effect of adversarial examples.
B. SON Use Case - Detection of Abnormal KPI
Figure. 1 states the generic flow chart of SON methodology
consisting of its main use cases of self-optimization and Self-
configuration of a LTE (Long Term Evolution) network [14].
Two main functions of LTE architecture are (i) Evolved Uni-
versal Terrestrial Radio Access Network (E-UTRAN) and (ii)
Evolved Packet Core (EPC). E-UTRAN consists of multiple
base stations, termed as e-NodeB and User Equipment (UE).
UE is typically a smartphone or an IoT device for using call
or data services after setting up a connection to a cell of the
cellular network. A Cell is a specific terrestrial area controlled
by each eNodeB.
Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) explain the quality of
services (QoS) and quality of experience (QoE) of these
connected devices. For example, KPIs that are relevant to
call or data services setup and services completion belong to
Accessibility and Retainability classes of KPIs respectively.
The calculation of these KPIs is based on the measurement
reports, which are collected through various internal and
external data collection methods. SON continuously monitors
these KPIs and in case of any abnormality, automatically starts
relevant optimization and configuration tasks.
Figure 1. SON Methodology Flow Chart. SON function continuously
monitors the KPIs and starts automatic optimization and configuration actions
based on KPI measurements
E-RAB Drop Rate is one of the significant KPIs to judge
user experience and belongs to the retainability class of KPIs.
Effective and timely detection of this indicator is essential to
avoid users churn. Brief description of this KPI is mentioned
below:
When a User Equipment (UE) has data to send or receive,
it sets up an end to end communication channel called EPS
Radio Access Bearer (E-RAB) between itself and the core
network part of EPC. This E-RAB is the access layer bearer for
carrying service data of a UE. After the utilization of cellular
services, UE releases its Radio Access Bearer (RAB). This
RAB is considered as a drop if it is released abnormally i.e.
ongoing session is dropped requiring the user to initiate a new
connection to resume services. This drop rate is measured as a
fraction of the total number of abnormal releases with normal
releases.
ERABDropRate % = 100× ERABAbnormal Releases
ERABNormal Releases
C. Dataset and Data Pre-processing
For the use case of E-RAB Drop Rate detection, records
are extracted from live LTE network. Each row contains an
hourly record of a specific eNodeB with a sudden increase in
E-RAB Drop Rate is labeled as an anomaly. Initial experiments
involve total 4464 records of two LTE eNodeBs. 3940 records
are labeled as normal and 524 as anomalies based on domain
knowledge. Each sample has 22 features, which are divided
into three main categories of (i) time and location, (ii) de-
pendent features (E-RAB drop reasons) and (iii) independent
features (signal strengths, latency, and the number of users).
This dataset has binary and nominal data variables and we
have applied one-hot encoding to convert nominal features to
numeric features since DNNs cannot operate on nominal data
directly. This resulted in the transformation of the 25-feature
dataset into a 26-feature dataset after one-hot encoding.
After analyzing the data, we have noticed varying distri-
butions of each feature. For example, the mean and standard
distribution of some features are larger by seven orders of
magnitude from some other features. Without performing
normalization, these features would dominate other features.
To mitigate this effect, we have used min-max scaling using
Scikit-learn library to normalize data. For our use case of
anomaly detection in the dataset of E-RAB Drop Rate, we have
used Multilayer Perceptron (MLP) classifier with the activation
function of ReLU using Keras and Tensorflow sequential
model. The MLP model is composed of three hidden layers
of 256 neural units. The output layer contains two neurons
since labels have two normal and abnormal classes. For
regularization, dropout with a rate of 0.4 and early-stopping
is used.
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we have provided a detailed evaluation of
our experiment results.
A. Evaluation Metric
We have used accuracy for performance evaluation of
results. Accuracy is defined as the percentage of correctly
classified records over the total number of records. After
training the DNN model, and testing its accuracy, we have
implemented both FGSM and JSMA attacks for evaluation of
the impact of adversarial examples at the dataset. Accuracy is
again measured after implementation of Adversarial Training
as a defensive technique.
B. Experiment Results
1) Impact on Accuracy: Figure 1 and figure 2 describe the
experimental results after implementing adversarial examples
and defensive technique of adversarial training at the dataset. It
is clear that adversarial examples have significantly degraded
the performance of DNNs used in SON. We have observed
JSMA caused more performance degradation than FGSM.
However, JSMA requires more computation time for crafting
an adversarial example. Our results in figure 1 and 2 also
depict the performance of DNN-based abnormal KPI after
the adversarial training. It is evident from the results that
adversarial training has performed better against FGSM as
compared to JSMA.
2) Features Explanations: Most affected features are calcu-
lated through the technique mentioned in [21]. We have ranked
and sorted the features with their importance after generating
the adversarial test set. This importance is calculated by
subtracting the original test set from the adversarial test set.
The indexes where adversaries have no impact, the value
of this subtraction is zero. However, for indexes which are
affected by the attack, the value of this subtraction is non-zero.
By calculating these non-zero values, most affected features
are calculated.
Figure 2. Performance of abnormal KPI detector before and after FGSM
attack. The figure also provides the results of adversarial training which tells
the recovery of the abnormal KPI detector.
Figure 3. Performance of abnormal KPI detector before and after JSMA
attack. The figure also provides the results of adversarial training which tells
the recovery of the abnormal KPI detector.
As expected, FGSM changed almost all features (22 out of
25). However, it is not possible to avoid human observation
when the scale of the adversary is on such a large level.
Whereas JSMA changed six features and degraded the perfor-
mance of model badly. We have observed the most affected
features and compared them with the domain knowledge of
cellular networks. For instance, we have an understanding
from the dataset that most of the E-RAB drops are due to the
transport network layer (TNL) problems and almost identical
features of TNL drops are observed after examining the most
vulnerable features by JSMA attack.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have performed FGSM and JSMA attack
on DNN-based abnormal KPI detector. Our results indicate
more than 60% drop in the performance of DNN-based
abnormal KPI detector making it very evident that DNN used
for detection does not provide robustness against adversarial
perturbation. A prominent recovery in the performance of
abnormal KPI detector is noticed after we have used adver-
sarial training as a defense against adversarial examples. We
have also provided the reasons why adversarial attacks are so
effective against abnormal KPI detector by utilizing insights
from explainable AI. Our results also trhow the light on a
previously ignored area of machine learning security in the
SON and provide good insights for developing a robust ML-
based SON solution.
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